While the concept of the 'learning curve' is widely accepted and understood in medical education, the ethical appreciation of what this involves for patients has been under-represented in medical journals. Advances in medical technology have produced an armoury of diagnostic and therapeutic invasive procedures, which must be perfected by anaesthetists for the benefit of patients. Anaesthetic training involves practice using patients, which potentially exposes patients to excess procedural risk. However, such risk can be minimised through close supervision of trainees and the development of non-patient training aids. Most importantly, for training to be ethical, it must involve the patient: it is for patients to decide whether they consent to taking part in training and their consent should always be sought where possible.
Invasive anaesthetic procedures require a dexterity which can only be mastered through repetition of the procedure and ongoing refinement of the anaesthetist's technique 1 . Traditionally, anaesthetic procedures have been taught through mentorship 2 , with the implicit expectation that patients can be used as 'teaching opportunities' for the purposes of trainees' education 3 . However, this assumption has considerable ethical ramifications and it is the aim of this paper to illustrate and discuss these.
THE LEARNING CURVE
Anaesthetists learning new procedures follow a 'learning curve', a term which describes a relationship between the number of procedural failures (high to begin with, decreasing with practice) and the number of successes (low to begin with, increasing with practice) (Figure 1) .
Many aspects of a procedure can be learnt using simulators 4 (e.g. endotracheal intubation) or consenting volunteers (e. g. intravenous cannulation), but eventually trainees must learn to perform the procedure on patients 5 , which poses ethical questions.
Let us reconsider the learning curve. An 'ideal' curve is shown graphically in Figure 2 (line I).
The 'ideal' curve is attained when a trainee performs the procedure successfully at the first attempt and subsequently never fails to perform the procedure successfully. This may occur with very simple procedures (for example, recording body temperature with a sublingual thermometer). However, trainees usually experience some failures, producing learning curves similar to line A in Figure 2 .
There are three phases to this stylised learning curve. Initially, there is a 'learning phase' where there is a lower success ratio, possibly with as many failures as successes. As a trainee improves, he or she enters a 'consolidation phase', where the failure and complication rates are lower. Eventually, this trainee reaches a 'plateau phase' and becomes competent at the procedure, with failures occurring only rarely. Eventually, the operator may be considered an expert having successfully completed a number of procedures without failure in the plateau phase. Each phase may be of variable length; for example, one study has shown that the learning phase for spinal anaesthesia requires about 20 attempts and the consolidation phase (to reach 90% effectiveness) may require a further 25 attempts 6 . Progression from learning to consolidation to plateau is not inevitable, and instead regression down the learning curve may occur after initial improvement in the success ratio. 
ETHICAL RELEVANCE
When procedures are practised on a simulator, disparity between the ideal curve and actual curve is of little consequence: simulators can be reset and trainees can try again.
However, when procedures are practised on patients, any disparity between the curves has ethical relevance. Failed procedures can have one or two (or both) adverse consequences for patients. First, the patients do not receive the intended benefit of the procedure. Second, they may experience a procedural complication. The greater the rightward shift of the actual learning curve away from the ideal learning curve, the greater the risk/benefit ratio of the procedure for the patient. Given the excess of risk, training that involves patients must be justified.
ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION
(See Table 1 , Glossary.) From a utilitarian point of view, training using patients is morally justified providing that the 'greatest good' is achieved, in this instance that any harm to patients which occurs figure 1: A simple, stylised learning curve. Each successive success is plotted one division further along the x-axis, each successive failure is plotted one division further up the y-axis. The line represents the 'best fit' among these plots. Initially, there are approximately as many failures as successes. Eventually, with experience, there are mostly successes and few failures, and the curve flattens off.
figure 2: 'Ideal' and 'actual' stylised learning curves. Note that the axes are different from Figure 1 . The 'success ratio' is calculated as 'successful attempts/total attempts'. Line I=ideal learning curve. Line A=actual learning curve. Note that even experienced operators have a failure rate -line A, therefore, never reaches a success ratio of 1.
during training is exceeded by the benefits of society having trained doctors. Two criticisms of this justification arise: first, it could be argued that the use of patients is unjust, because it is they that may be harmed, without reaping the benefits of the doctor's future expertise. Second, the practice patient may be very badly harmed indeed, because the trainee may not recognise his or her limitations, when a procedure is going very wrong or know how to deal with a complication, although this is unlikely if the trainee is well mentored. However, justification through social utility is valid, provided that practice patients accept the concepts that the trainer supervising the trainee had to learn the procedure on previous patients, that the same patient may benefit from a trained doctor's expertise in the future and that without training, the patient's procedure might not have been possible. Nevertheless, utility requires a measure of altruism on the part of the practice patient.
Deontological justification is more problematic 7 because 'practice' patients are treated as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. Deontology recognises the moral importance of duty, such that certain acts are seen as wrong in themselves, even if they are intended to have a beneficial outcome ('the ends do not justify the means'). With regard to training, therefore, deontology obliges the trainer/trainee to provide the best care available and to avoid causing harm to the patient; this is more likely to occur with the trainer as operator, which gives rise to a dilemma, namely how trainees are then expected to train without in vivo practice. This conundrum may be partly resolved by considering the problem on a societal basis: although it is generally 'right' both to avoid causing preventable harm to patients and to optimise their treatment, this must be balanced against the general 'rightness' that a society should contain trained doctors in order to prevent future harm to patients. Unless and until other methods of training can be found that do not involve patients and allow trainees to reach an acceptable level of expertise, then the balance is surely in favour of allowing training using patients.
Communitarianism 8 infers an informal, reciprocal 'contract' between individuals and society, such that, for example, individuals are morally obliged to volunteer themselves for the purposes of medical training in return for receiving healthcare and for the benefit of society in general.
Virtue ethics focuses on what the 'good' or 'virtuous' individual would do when acting as trainee/ trainer or patient, in order to make themselves more virtuous. With regard to practising techniques on patients, such an individual-centred approach can give rise to inherent paternalism: doctors may be tempted to 'use' patients to achieve the virtue of greater technical proficiency, in excess of the more equivocal virtue achieved by the patient when acting as a 'guinea-pig'.
Ethical justification is best provided by a principlist approach. Learning episodes should be beneficent, such that the intent of the training procedure should be to benefit the patient rather than the trainee (for example, the siting of a central venous catheter by a trainee could be justified for the purposes of monitoring during laparotomy, but not if it was not clinically indicated or if the trainee felt pressured to meet a formal log-book target); non-maleficent, avoiding excessive patient harm, for example, through use of simulators and supervised training; and just, such that the trainer/trainee should not expect a patient to participate in training unless they themselves would be prepared to act similarly as 'practice' patients. Finally, the trainee must recognise the patient's autonomy 9 , by respecting a patient's refusal to participate in anaesthetic training 10 . It follows that respecting a patient's autonomy requires the trainer/trainee to seek the patient's consent to training.
PATIENT CONSENT FOR TRAINING PROCEDURES
In most English-speaking jurisdictions, legally valid consent is given voluntarily, by an appropriately informed person who has the requisite capacity to exercise an informed choice 11 .
Voluntariness
Patient voluntariness can be affected by a variety of factors, including third party influences, the effects of pain, disease or medication, the anaesthetistpatient dynamic itself or even the name of the hospital (e.g. St. Elsewhere's Teaching Hospital). Obviously, neither the trainer nor the trainee should pressure the patient into agreeing to participate in the learning (or early practice) of new techniques by a trainee 12 : resources permitting, these should take place during consultant-supervised lists only. It follows that patients should not be coerced by inexperienced trainees into agreeing to the learning or early practice of new techniques during traineeled lists, and reinforces the importance of trainee competence certification, such that trainees may only practise newly-learnt techniques without supervision once they have been deemed competent to do so by appropriately experienced trainers.
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2009 Information Legally, the patient should be informed about both what is to be done and why, and the risks and consequences of any procedure. Failing to identify the trainee as a trainee or the training nature of the procedure could invalidate the patient's consent.
Normally, the trainer would be the most appropriate person to elicit consent from the patient for the purposes of training, because they have an appropriate understanding of the necessary information that should be relayed. It could be argued, however, that consent is part of the procedure itself and as such the trainee should participate in the consent process. A pragmatic approach would be for the trainee to observe the trainer seeking consent for training purposes, before reversing these roles, with the trainer present merely to add any further information as necessary.
Operator-specific information about risks and consequences is problematic, for the simple reason that trainees lack sufficient data about their experience on which to base their information. There is no general legal requirement to provide patients with operator-specific data about the risks of a procedure, although this may be the case in the future. However, depending on the trainee's experience, patients may be at a greater or lesser risk of not benefiting from treatment or suffering complications. It is difficult, therefore, to quantify and communicate the 'training' risk to patients, over and above the risks inherent in any anaesthetic procedure. Nevertheless, trainers are obliged to tell patients about the training element of proposed procedures and to explain that an increased risk of complications is possible. This obligation underpins the absolute requirement for appropriate trainee supervision, allowing reassurance that under supervision, the additional risk is likely to be negligible 13 .
Several simple statistical methods can be used by trainees both to inform themselves, trainers or patients about their operator-specific risk, and to enable analysis of improving proficiency throughout training (or identify training problems). These include the keeping of a logbook of the number procedures attempted and their outcome, calculation of the success or complication ratios (see above) and cumulative summation [14] [15] [16] [17] .
Competence
In western jurisdictions, only competent patients can normally consent to or refuse, in this case, an anaesthetic procedure performed by a trainee as part of their education. The trainer/trainee must assure themselves that the patient is competent to make a decision whether or not to consent to taking part in training.
By inference, a trainee should not practice using a patient who lacks capacity, unless consent has previously been given by the patient in the form of an advanced decision. Practising on dead or nearly dead patients, for example, is considered morally unacceptable without consent 18 . Treatment administered to an incompetent adult patient is normally given in the patient's best interests, obliging optimal (i.e. non-trainee) treatment to be given, which has obvious repercussions for the education of trainees in intensive care medicine, for example. Training should be possible, however, if the trainee is closely supervised in order that the risks to the patient are minimised and the benefits maximised.
So far, this paper has referred to the ethics of an inexperienced trainee learning a new skill, and has emphasised the absolute necessity of both specific consent for training and appropriate supervision throughout training. Two further scenarios need to be considered, concerning the ethics of maintaining skills and the learning of new skills by experienced doctors.
MAINTENANCE OF SKILL
By separating the training aspects of a procedure from its therapeutic aspects, yentis has suggested that specific consent is not necessary when maintaining a skill, unless the skill being maintained is additional to standard treatment 19 . However, this argument justifies a failure to inform the patient that the anaesthetist may be intending to use a potentially riskier technique.
For example, compared to laryngoscopic endotracheal intubation (LEI), fibreoptic intubation is a riskier procedure for the inexperienced anaesthetist. Trainee anaesthetists should ask for patients' consent when learning LEI, as detailed above. However, after a certain number of procedures, the anaesthetist becomes skilled at this technique. With experience, an anaesthetist might fail to intubate 1:500 patients 20 . At what point, then, is the need for 'training consent' precluded, over and above general consent for anaesthesia? The most obvious point would seem to be at the start of the plateau phase: the anaesthetist may still have room for improvement of their technique, but the number of procedural failures or complications is statistically similar to true experts of the procedure.
Fibreoptic intubation is a technically more complex skill to learn, with a rightward shift of the learning curve compared to LEI. Therefore, the trainee will have to seek consent from a greater number of patients before reaching the plateau phase. Nevertheless, success and complication ratios are similar between the two techniques on the plateau phase. yentis is correct to argue that anaesthetists skilled in both techniques do not require separate training consent if they elect to maintain their skill in fibreoptic intubation, because the operator risk/benefit ratio to patients is the same as for LEI. However, this author suggests that if the procedural success ratio begins to fall away through non-maintenance of a skill, then the operator should once again consider seeking specific consent in order to practice that procedure.
TEACHING OLD DOGS NEW TRICKS
Advances in medical technology demand that experienced anaesthetists continue to learn new skills. A senior anaesthetist learning a new technique will proceed along a learning curve in the normal fashion. There is an onus on him or her, therefore, to request a patient's consent to practise the new technique. However, an ethical problem arises if the new technique achieves only a similar outcome to the anaesthetist's standard technique.
Consider a senior cardiac anaesthetist placing a central venous catheter in the right internal jugular vein using a landmark technique, a procedure that he or she may perform more than 600 times a year, with a success ratio of 0.99 and an insertion complication ratio (i.e. number of complications/ total number of attempts) of 0.01. Worried about the quasi-legal implications of professional guidelines, he or she decides to learn how to perform the procedure under ultrasound guidance. Inevitably, they follow a new learning curve (Figure 3 ).
In this example, area A represents increased procedural risk for practice patients, in terms of both the consequences of failure to cannulate and the complications suffered by the patients, as described previously. Although it might be possible to minimise this area through training and the use of simulators, area A represents additional harm to which patients would not otherwise have been exposed if the anaesthetist had used his or her usual (landmark) technique; it appears therefore that it is not ethically justified for the anaesthetist to learn the new technique. This does not suggest that the anaesthetist should not learn the new technique, merely that serious consideration should be given to the likely net benefit/risk to future patients when deciding whether to learn the new technique or not. Such an estimation implies that experienced anaesthetists appear to be ethically justified in learning a new procedural technique only if the new technique produces significantly better results than the old technique in that operator's hands.
In the example above, Figure 3 illustrates that the cardiac anaesthetist eventually has a greater success ratio using an ultrasound-guided technique, compared to landmark guidance. After point X, patients benefit from his/her new expertise in excess of what they might previously expected (represented by area B). If the area of B eventually exceeds the area of A, then overall patients have benefited and learning the new technique may be ethically justified. However in this example, where the success ratios of the two procedures are very similar, it may take many years of performing the new procedure until area B becomes larger than area A, to the extent that this may never happen (particularly if the anaesthetist is older, with fewer years left to practice). In order to learn a new technique to achieve the same outcome (e.g. ultrasound-versus nerve stimulator-guided regional nerve block), therefore, the more rarely performed it is, the greater the benefit of the new technique must be compared to the old in order to justify learning the procedure.
CONCLUSION
The assumption that patients exist (in part) for the purpose of training anaesthetists is untenable in modern medical ethics. In this author's experience, provided that they are reassured about the constancy of the supervision that trainees will receive, patients are happy to participate with training. Informing patients about their proposed role is unlikely to reduce the number of training opportunities 3, 21 .
As the group of non-surgical doctors who perform the greatest number of invasive procedures in hospitals, anaesthetists should seek to lead by example and act on our moral obligation to seek patients' consent prior to performing a procedure for training purposes. Utilitarianism. An ethical theory that is concerned with the foreseeable consequences of an action. The morality of an act is determined by weighing the 'happiness' consequent to that act against the 'unhappiness' caused, regardless of the nature of the act, such that the 'best' acts lead to the greatest good for the greatest number of people. For example, utilitarianism might condone murder in order to prevent an act of terrorism.
Deontology. An ethical theory that is concerned with duties and obligations. The morality of an act is determined by how closely an individual acts according to their duty, regardless of the consequences, such that the 'best' act is one performed by an actor according to a specified duty or obligation. For example, deontology might condone telling the truth even if disclosure led to the death of a third party. The Hippocratic Oath is an example of a deontological moral code.
Communitarianism. An ethical theory that emphasises the importance of community, such that individuals are morally obliged to act in the best interests of a community (for example, by paying taxes) in return for the benefits that such a community might provide (for example, free health care).
Virtue theory is concerned with how an individual acts according to their character. A 'virtuous' doctor performs the 'right' act in the circumstances that arise, 'right' being determined in accordance with virtues such as professionalism and honesty.
Principlism invokes a set of four principlesbeneficence ('do good'), non-maleficence ('don't do bad'), respect for autonomy ('let the patient decide') and justice ('act fairly') -that are to be used when determining the morality of an action. Principlism may be superimposed on the ethical theories described above, such that the morality of an apparently utilitarian action may be calculated by the benefit/harm ratio of each principle.
